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A NEW KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL BASED ON THE
DECOMPOSITION PROBLEM
VLADIMIR SHPILRAIN AND ALEXANDER USHAKOV
Abstract. In this paper we present a new key establishment protocol
based on the decomposition problem in non-commutative groups which
is: given two elements w,w1 of the platform group G and two sub-
groups A,B ⊆ G (not necessarily distinct), find elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B
such that w1 = awb. Here we introduce two new ideas that improve
the security of key establishment protocols based on the decomposition
problem. In particular, we conceal (i.e., do not publish explicitly) one
of the subgroups A,B, thus introducing an additional computationally
hard problem for the adversary, namely, finding the centralizer of a given
finitely generated subgroup.
1. Introduction
In search of a more efficient and/or secure alternative to established cryp-
tographic protocols (such as RSA), several authors have come up with
public key establishment protocols as well as with complete public key
cryptosystems based on allegedly hard search problems from combinatorial
(semi)group theory, including the conjugacy search problem [1, 15], the ho-
momorphism search problem [14], [18], the decomposition search problem
[5, 15, 17], the subgroup membership search problem [19].
In this paper, we focus on the decomposition search problem which we
subsequently call just the decomposition problem. The problem is: given
two elements w,w1 of the platform group G and two subgroups A,B ⊆ G
(not necessarily distinct), find elements a ∈ A, b ∈ B such that w1 = awb.
It is straightforward to arrange a key establishment protocol based on
this problem (see [5, 15, 17]), assuming that ab = ba for any a ∈ A, b ∈ B:
(0) One of the parties (say, Alice) publishes a random element w ∈ G (the
“base” element).
(1) Alice chooses a1, a2 ∈ A (Alice’s private keys) and sends a1wa2 to Bob.
(2) Bob chooses b1, b2 ∈ B (Bob’s private keys) and sends b1wb2 to Alice.
(3) Alice computes
Ka = a1b1wba2b2
and Bob computes
Kb = b1a1wa2b2.
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If aibi = biai, then Ka = Kb in G. Thus Alice and Bob have a shared secret
key.
Security of such a protocol will, of course, depend on a particular platform
group G (at the very least, G has to be non-commutative). It appears that
for braid groups (which are a popular choice for the platform), the so-called
length attacks present a serious threat, see e.g. [8, 12, 13, 16].
In this paper, we introduce two new ideas that improve the security of
key establishment protocols based on the decomposition problem:
(i) We conceal one of the subgroups A,B.
(ii) We make Alice choose her left private key a1 from one of the subgroups
A,B, and her right private key a2 from the other subgroup. Same for Bob.
These two improvements together will obviously foil any length attacks.
We give a complete description of our protocol in the following Section 2;
here we just sketch the main idea.
Let G be a group and g ∈ G. Denote by CG(g) the centralizer of g in G,
i.e., the set of elements h ∈ G such that hg = gh. For S = {g1, . . . , gk} ⊆ G,
CG(g1, . . . , gk) denotes the centralizer of S in G, which is the intersection of
the centralizers CG(gi), i = 1, ..., k.
Now, given a public w ∈ G, Alice privately selects a1 ∈ G and publishes
a subgroup B ⊆ CG(a1) (we explain why computing B is easy). Similarly,
Bob privately selects b2 ∈ G and publishes a subgroup A ⊆ CG(b2). Alice
then selects a2 ∈ A and sends w1 = a1wa2 to Bob, while Bob selects b1 ∈ B
and sends w2 = b1wb2 to Alice.
Thus, in the first transmission, say, the adversary faces the problem of
finding a1, a2 such that w1 = a1wa2, where a2 ∈ A, but there is no explicit
indication of where to choose a1 from. Therefore, before arranging some-
thing like a length attack in this case, the adversary would have to compute
the centralizer CG(B) first (because a1 ∈ CG(B)), which is usually a hard
problem by itself.
2. The protocol
In this section we give a formal description of our protocol, but first
we introduce one more piece of notation. As it is common in public key
exchange based on abstract groups, when transmitting an element g ∈ G
of a group, one actually uses its normal form N(g) which is a sequence of
symbols uniquely defined for a given g. A specific way of constructing such
a sequence depends, of course, on a particular platform group G which we
discuss in subsequent sections of our paper.
Our protocol is the following sequence of steps.
Protocol:
(1) Alice chooses an element a1 ∈ G of length l, chooses a subgroup
of CG(a1), and publishes its generators A = {α1, . . . , αk} (see the
following subsection 2.1 for specifications).
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(2) Bob chooses an element b2 ∈ G of length l, chooses a subgroup
of CG(b2), and publishes its generators B = {β1, . . . , βm} (see the
following subsection 2.1 for specifications).
(3) Alice chooses a random element a2 from 〈β1, . . . , βm〉 and sends the
normal form PA = N(a1wa2) to Bob.
(4) Bob chooses a random element b1 from 〈α1, . . . , αk〉 and sends the
normal form PB = N(b1wb2) to Alice.
(5) Alice computes KA = a1PBa2.
(6) Bob computes KB = b1PAb2.
Since a1b1 = b1a1 and a2b2 = b2a2, we have K = KA = KB , the shared
secret key.
2.1. Suggested values of parameters. We suggest to use the following
values of parameters in the above protocol: G = Bn, the group of braids on
n strands (see our Section 4); n = 64; l = 1024. At Step (1) of the protocol
Alice generates (a1, A) and at Step (2) Bob generates (b2, B), both using
the algorithm from [7] for computing centralizers (actually, there is no need
to compute the whole centralizer, just a couple of elements are sufficient).
3. Requirements on the platform group G
In this section we discuss possible attacks on the protocol described in the
previous section, and also put together some requirements on the platform
group G.
To break the protocol it is sufficient to find either Alice’s or Bob’s private
key which may be accomplished as follows:
Attack on Alice’s private key. Find an element a′1 which com-
mutes with every element of the subgroup 〈A〉 and an element
a′2 ∈ 〈B〉, such that PA = N(a
′
1wa
′
2). The pair (a
′
1, a
′
2) is equiv-
alent to (a1, a2). (That means, a
′
1wa
′
2 = a1wa2, and therefore the
pair (a′1, a
′
2) can be used by the adversary to get the shared secret
key.)
Attack on Bob’s private key. Find an element b′1 ∈ 〈A〉 and an
element b′2 which commutes with every element of the subgroup 〈B〉,
such that PB = N(b
′
1wb
′
2). The pair (b
′
1, b
′
2) is equivalent to (b1, b2).
Consider the attack on Alice’s private key (the other one is similar). The
most obvious way to carry out such an attack is the following:
(A1) Compute the centralizer CG(A).
(A2) Solve the search version of the membership problem in the double
coset CG(A) · w · 〈B〉
To make the protocol secure, we want both these problems to be com-
putationally hard. For the problem (A2) to be hard, it is necessary for the
centralizer CG(A) to be large. Otherwise, the adversary can use the “brute
force” attack, i.e., enumerate all elements of CG(A) and find candidates for
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b′2 (assuming that the decisional membership problem in the subgroup B is
efficiently solvable).
Thus the platform group G should satisfy at least the following properties
in order for our key establishment protocol to be efficient and secure.
(P1) G should be a non-commutative group of exponential growth. The
latter means that the number of elements of length n in G is expo-
nential in n; this is needed to prevent attacks by complete exhaustion
of the key space.
(P2) There should be an efficiently computable normal form for elements
of G.
(P3) It should be computationally easy to perform group operations (mul-
tiplication and inversion) on normal forms.
(P4) It should be computationally easy to generate pairs (a, {a1, . . . , ak})
such that aai = aia for each i = 1, . . . , k. (Clearly, in this case the
subgroup generated by a1, . . . , ak centralizes a).
(P5) For a generic set {g1, . . . , gk} of elements of G it should be difficult
to compute
C(g1, . . . , gn) = C(g1) ∩ . . . ∩ C(gk).
(P6) Even if H = C(g1, . . . , gn) is computed, it should be hard to find
x ∈ H and y ∈ H1 (where H1 is some fixed subgroup given by a
generating set) such that xwy = w′, i.e., to solve the membership
search problem for a double coset.
4. Braid groups
In this section we consider a particular class of groups, namely braid
groups, which were a popular choice for the platform of various crypto-
graphic protocols in the last 6-7 years, starting with the seminal paper [1].
Let Bn be the group of braids on n strands and Xn = {x1, . . . , xn−1} the
set of standard generators. Thus,
Bn = 〈x1, . . . , xn−1; xixi+1xi = xi+1xixi+1, xixj = xjxi for |i− j| > 1〉.
For more information on braid groups, we refer to the monographs [2],
[6]; here we address the properties (P1)-(P6) from the previous section.
(P1) Braid groups Bn are non-commutative groups of exponential growth
if n ≥ 3.
(P2) There are several known normal forms for elements of Bn, including
Garside normal form (see [2]) and Birman-Ko-Lee normal form [3].
Both of these forms are efficiently computable (in quadratic time
with respect to the length of a given element).
(P3) There are quadratic time algorithms to multiply or invert normal
forms of elements of Bn.
(P4) It is not so easy to compute the whole centralizer of an element g
of G (cf. [11]). The number of steps required to compute CG(g)
is proportional to |SSS(g)|, the size of the “super summit set” of
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g, which is typically huge. Nevertheless, there are approaches to
finding “large parts” of CG(g), e.g. one can generate a sufficiently
large part of SSS(g) and pick several elements from there, see [11]
for more details.
(P5) For a generic subgroup A it is hard to compute CG(A). The com-
plexity of such computation is proportional to |SS(A)|, the size of
the summit set of A (see [7]), which is typically huge.
(P6) There is no known solution to the membership search problem for
double cosets H · w · H ′ in braid groups. This problem, in theory,
appears to be much more complicated (for generic subgroups H and
H ′) than the conjugacy search problem.
5. Semantic security
In this section, we discuss semantic security of a cryptosystem that would
be based on a shared key obtained in our protocol. Semantic security is the
standard notion of security for encryption protocols, see [10].
Security of the protocol described in our Section 2 is based on the as-
sumption that the following problem is computationally hard:
Given the public information w, PA, and PB it is hard to
compute the shared key K.
This assumption is the computational assumption of the protocol. The
stronger decisional version of this assumption would be:
Given w, PA, and PB , it is hard to distinguish the shared
key K from a random element of the form awb.
We should point out that without this decisional assumption, it may
still be possible to design a semantically secure encryption protocol in the
“random oracle model” the same way it was done in [15, Section 3.3], namely,
by employing a hash function H : Bn → {0, 1}
k from the braid group to
the message space. Still, it would be quite interesting to find out whether
or not the shared key K obtained in our key establishment protocol can be
directly used for semantically secure encryption.
The decisional assumption above appears to be wrong for most choices
of w,PA and PB because of the following consideration. Since PA = a1wa2,
we have a1 = PAa
−1
2 w
−1. Therefore, K = a1b1wb2a2 = PAa
−1
2 (w
−1PB)a2.
Hence, K is a product of a public element PA and a public element w
−1PB
conjugated by an element from a subgroup {β1, . . . , βk}.
It seems plausible that, for some choices of the keys, elements of this
type can be distinguished from random elements of the form awb along the
same lines it was done in [9] (in a different, but similar context). Indeed, if
w−1PB is not a pure braid, then it projects to a non-trivial permutation, call
it ρB , under the natural homomorphism pi from the braid group Bn onto the
symmetric group Sn. Then the conjugate permutation pi(a2)
−1ρBpi(a2) has
the same cyclic structure as ρB does, and this gives away some information
about the permutation pi(K) = pi(PA)pi(a2)
−1ρBpi(a2); for example, from
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knowing pi(PA) and the cyclic structure of pi(a2)
−1ρBpi(a2), one can get
information about possible order of the permutation pi(K).
If both PA and w
−1PB are pure braids, then it is possible to use other
homomorphisms (e.g. pulling out a strand) to obtain some partial informa-
tion; see [9] for details. If w−1PB is a pure braid but PA is not, then, again,
the homomorphism pi reveals partial information about the shared key K.
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